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To all reasonable appearances the study of pasty politics 
in South Africa is the study of white politics. SiPee Union the 
white community has enjoyed a virtual monopoly cf the electoraJ. and 
parliamentary processes. To w e  a Namerim concept, the political 
nation has approximated to the white electorate. Only white political 
pasties have been able to function. The issues dividing these parties 
would seem, in the main, to have been issues internal to the white 
community. Whether white politics are re@d,aa Hamock puts it, 
as "a debate among Afrikaners about what to do aboat the mishl', the 
result is the same. LBngusge equality, the "two streamsn policy, 
l'South Africa firstn, and the future of the imperial colurection - all 
were 'white-whiten issues. They make perfect sense on their own 
terms, and they represent the South African version of similar issues 
that arose at the seae time in the other Dominions sad in Ireland. 
In South Africa, in fact, they engendered more bitterness and violence 
then elsewhere. Ebn so, they seem to have little relevance to the 
cmcerna of the non-ate communities making up the majority of the 
population. (1921 Census: European 1,519,488; Asiatic 165,731; 
Mixed and other (Coloured) 545,548; BBntu 4,697,813. Total: 
6,928,580.) 
The reality was that all political life in South Africa was 
set in the fmww~rk of a plural or multi-racial society. Even 
accepting that the history of party pelitics must in the main, almost 
by definition, be that of white politics, it would olearly involve 
serious distortion to ignore the multi-racial bimeasion. There are 
various ways in which the fact of the plural society can be seen to 
penetrate psvrty developments. If there were only whites to consider, 
we should m t  tslk of "white politicsn. There have alvays been two 
strands in South African politics, one of white-white questions and 
the other of black-white questions, and they have alweya been closely 
interwoven. The black-white strand did not suddenly appear in the 
apartheid general election of 1948. It uaa already them in the I 
gensral election8 of 1924 and 1929. It has also been present in many 
ostensibly white-white isaues. T$e Hationaliste fouud it a simple 
mtter, as early as 1914, to link the question of the imperial 
connectian to that of the treatment of Indiana in South Africa. The 
question of imoLigxation hse alwpys had a plural side. The Afrikamr 
fear and the English hope wss that immigration would one daJr give the 
English section a ~@orSty brong the whitam. But, from the W t e  
point of view, imigcafion o d d  also man IUL Impmvement of the ratio 
of white to black. In the period covered here it wan the Afrikomr 
feas that prevailed. Only the Unienists (the party of the "South 
African Britiehn) advmcated state-subsidised Wgrotion, while the 
Sath African Party expressed tepid approval for "desirable m e a n  
irerpigratid. The Nationalist pro- of priaciples e~plicitly 
rejected any expenditure on bmigmition until the state had facilitated 
the settlement on the lad of "burgersn (meaning primarily, in this 
context, poor whites). 
This paper *U3 atfenpt to oonr two broad aspects of the 
corrnectians between the plural society pad the workings of party 
politics. The first concerns the relation between a t  used to be 
called Wative Policyn to party politios. The second assesses the 
relevance of political activity en the part of the non-whites lkemelves, 
including the limited access of some of them to the fmmchise in the 
Cape. 
Despite the presence of a plural dislWion in practically all 
political questions in Sonth Africa, a determined effort wcrs made to 
keep especially "Native Affairsn in as separate a category of treatment 
ss was possible. Part of the background to this waa that the 
ssswnption, hardly challenged in these yeare, that the colonial powers 
in Africa were in the position of ruling trustees for their Africsrr 
subjects, was applied to the government 8nd parliament of the Union a8 
well. This approach meant the expectation of a patenulist polioy, 
perhaps even in perpetuity, especially if it was held that the wards 
were racially inferior. At the same time even a paternaliat policy wss 
meant to show progress of a kind, though not necessarily political 
izdvancement. The ideal, if vague, requirement waa that the ruling white 
minority in South Africa should raise the backward African majority in 
the scale of oivilisation. 
Almost from the moment political parties made their 
appearanoe in the Union, the wish waa expressed t b t  Native Affairs 
should be kept out of party politics as far aa possible. In Bathe's 
manifesto of principles for the S.A.P. in 1911, the following appears, 
taking its oue from Het Volk, the Botha-Smuts party in the Transvaal, 
five years earlierr 
"The placing of the Eative aestion 
above party politics, and the honourable 
and sympathetic treatment of the coloured 
races in a bmsd and liberal spirit. 
This sspiration had a coilstructive side. If Native Policy becrrme a 
football between the parties, the vacillations that would reeult might 
prove hamful and bewildering to the wards. This view waa shared by ' 
the small bend of dedicated and expert odPliaistrators in this field 
(mainly Cape offioials) that the Union had inherited from the colonial 
era. !hey had no wish to work in a framework of policy ahanges 
contingent upon party fluctuations or the ahanging personnel at the 
head of the Eative Affairs ministry. As they saw it, the party system 
encouraged lobbying by special interests, such re fazmers, landowners, 
the mines, liquor producers and traders. Concessions to these would 
mean arbitrary decisions ancl their frequent reversal instead of a 
coherent and consistent policy based upon their own kind of expertise. 
The fact that ahmst half of the Uaionts Africsns - those on the 
reserves designated in 1913 - were under the tutelage of such 
sdministrators lent flrkher weight to their views. 
The negative side of the idea ef keeping Native Affairs out 
of party politics wos revealed by &nuts before Union, when he 
remarked to Merrimaa that he did not believe in "politics for themnn, 
the Africans. Most politicians outside the Cape, and also the 
administrative experts, were in agreement with this notion that it 
was wiser to .think in t e w  of excluding Africans from the 0rdina-y 
political process. In his famous address to the Royal Colonial 
Institute and the African Society in 1917, Smuts went -er: 
"White and black are different not only in colour, but almost in 
soul; they are different in political structure, ePd their 
political institutions should be different ..." But keeping n%lack 
and white ... as frtr apart as possible in governmentn did not mean 
any relaxation of white rule. 
dlso implied in the attempt to exclude Native Affairs from 
the party arena was the idea that their administration could then 
take place on a hais of white consensue. This wos favoured by those 1 
who wished to avoid the suggestion of weakness that would be apparent 
in frequent policy changes. In a sense this was a variant of the I 
standad argument for the unity of the whites in the light of their 
vulnerability as a minority. Where WM unity more necesssrg thaa in I 
the area of Xative Policy itself? In prootice, this unity wos not i 
attained and Native Affairs were always the concern, and at times the 
main  concern, of the political parties. Equally, the differences 
between the parties on most other issues seldom lacked a bearing on 
Native Affairs themselves. It is worth asking questions about the 
influence of the vagaries of party fortunes and the facts of white 
division on the evolution of actual policy neasupes. One area to be 
investigated would be the role of g-S-roots opinion, aa expressed 
in resolutions at party conferences, for example, in the devising of 
policy by the leaders. The foundation congress of the S.A.P. in 
l911 provides esrly evidence for such opinion. Farmers pressed their 
need for more labour and their fear of competition from the mines a d  
towns. Other resolutions from the branches demonstrate rank and file 
hostility to any increase in the ownership and utilization of lend by 
dfricsns. Calls were made for a law to prevent n8squatting" by 
Africans on white farms. Hostility was expressed Bgainst what w a ~  
called %fir fanmh&I, whether by absentee and syndicate owners 
(including the companies in the northern Transvaal) or by 
wealthy and progressive farmers. 
Politics in South Africa were sufficiently elitist in 
character to prevent the leadership from being stampeded by such 
pressnres as these. To some extent the leaders themselves derived 
from backgrounds in which these attitudes were more or less 
universally accepted. !Phis would be true of Botha and Hertsog, if 
not of Smruts. They all worked subject to the knowledge that these 
attitudes were widely held aaolrg both their supporters and their 
opponents. To ieore them would mean not only inviting a popular veto 
on measures that liberal opinion might see as enlightened, but risking 
the penalty of defeat at the polls. 
All this can readily be illustrated, Grres-roots opinion in 
the S.A.P. achieved legislative expression in the Native LBnd Act of 
1913, in particular in the restrictions on African land purchase in 
those axeas designated as white. Where- the Beaumont Commission and 
the subsequent local committees reported in 1917/18 in favour of the 
consolidation of Afrioan landholding within the reserves, Botha shrank 
from placing their proposals before pwlipnent. Where- Smuts proud 
of the degree of consensus he achieved in carrying through his own 
legislation on Bative Affairs from 1919 to 1923 (taking the subject oat 
of party politics once more), he was, in fact, under constent Nationxilist 
and Labour criticiasl for not taking segregation fos enough. W i n g  the 
passage of his Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 he abandoned a vital 
principle, present in his original bill, by surrendering to the 
Nationalist insistence that there should be no guaranteed freehold or 
other security of tenure far Africans in the t o w .  
The statemm grappling with Native Policy vlrs in constant 
danger of being outbid from the right. After the S.A.P. found itself 
in opposition in 1924, it made an ocoaeionsl clumsy resort to the srw, 
technique: for example, Smuts' opposition to the prinoiple of a miziimum 
wage in the Wega Act of 1925, on the debatable ground that it would have 
the effect of reducing the wages of the most skilled white workers. 
More siepificant was that in office Hertsog himself aroused some 
rumbling8 of right wing discontent. Tielman Boos am¶ other T-vaal 
Nationalists objeated to his undertaking to leave the v o w  rights of 
Cape Coloureds undistnrbed, while removing those of the Africans. They 
calso disliked his proposals for the purchase, at the white taxpayer's 
expense, of more land for Africans as o kind of guid ~ r o  QUO for the 
loss of the franchise. 
There is evidence here of the exploitation of Native Policy 
differences as a weapon in the struggle between the parties for 
electoral support. The policies that emerged were devised and applied 
not in mu0 but in te- involving constpnt calculations as to what 
popular white reaotions were likely to be. Bertsog was a statesman of 
sufficient statura to avoid deliberate pandering, at the stage of 
policg formulation, to extreme prejudice. But, as the 'Black Periln 
campaign of 1929 showed, he waa fully alive to the device of appealing 
to prejudice for immediate electoral advantege. 
F o m d  psrty statements on Native Policy over the period as 
a whole are not very enlightening. The consistent Botionolist principle 
W white domination "in a spirit of Christian truateeshipn, with finn 
opposition to any of the racesn. The native should be given 
the opportunity to "develop himself accerding to his natural 
inclination and capacityw (Progrenrme of Principles, 1925, article 10 
[e]). The Unionists, as the chief opposition party in the thecede after 
1910, made little attempt to offer a coherent; alte-ive to the poliay 
of the governing S.A.P. While accepting the broad principle of white 
supmmcy, the perty embraced both Cape and "northernw schools on the 
issue of non-white political ri&ts and displqed comparable internal 
differences on the merits of a white labour policy and the industrial 
colour bar. After its absorption of the Unionists in 1920, the S.A.P. 
added to its appeal for inter-party co-operation "the endeavour to 
secuxe for the native races their natural and distinct developmentn, 
together with the pious hope that "all gcounds for f u h  discord 
between white and black shall be avoided" (Progranme of Principles, 
1925, article 9). Labour party policy atatements were dominated by 
the generally segcegationist views of its leader, Creswell, together 
with specific demand8 for an industrial colour bar. The mall 
on-war" group wbich broke away in 1915 under the influence of 
W. H. Andrews to f o m  the International Socialist League entertained l 
a conception of the working class that incorporated the black worker 
as well ss the white, but its electoral influence proved to be small. l 
If Native Policy came to serve 88 a convenient weapon in 
the party strqqgle, it was not one that could effectively be resorted 
to automatically and continuously. White agreement on essentials, 
suoh as the principle of permanent white supremacy was one reason 
for this. For B wedge to be driven between the parties in this 
sphere, fairly concrete and specific issues had first to arise. 
T h r o ~ o u t  the period politiciaas, both those in and out of office, 
had many other more pressing interests. Some of these centred on 
the task of constructive state-building that had to be embarked upon 
after the creation of the Union. Others concerned the passions 
aroused by war9 rebellion and strikes accompanied by violence. Unless 
some sectional white interest became involved and made itslef heard, 
or unless a h a t  was posed to law an& order, Native Affairs were on 
the whole left to take their own course. Once the Xative Lands Act 
had been passed in 1913, the inertia that set in was not broken until 
after the war. By then the oourse of social change - principally the 
migration of many African6 to the toms to join and ccnnpete with 
"poor whitesn in the labour market - waa forcing a new range of 
pmblema on the government. It was against this background that Smuts 
made his own cantribution to Union Native Policy. 
As far as the Pact parties are concerned, it would be 
incorrect to auggest that after the Rand Bevolt they shp1.y fastened 
on the industrial colour ixu: aa a convenient vote catcher. %t had 
been precisely the issue at stake in the Bead Bevolt, which arose out 
of a dispute that began outside the sphere to party politics. The 
Pact pmties went to work in a climate of demands from white workers 
and their trade unions for political action to safeguard their 
privileged status from non-white competition. Smats could offer them 
nothing, for in their eyes he stood accused (however inaccurately) of 
having favoured their "capitalistn opponents. To the extent that the 
Pact government facilitated the introduction of the industrial colour 
bax through the pass- of the Mines end Works Amendment Act of 1926, 
this waa partly the result of white trade union pressure. The Labour 
pasty was taking up the cudgels on behalf of the skilled white 
artisan, uruua3ly of "Britishw origin, seeking to protect himself from 
non-white empetition. The "civilised labour policgn, by &ich 
adninistrotkve action furnished pmtectedi aress of employment in state 
unde?&Wn@, such as the rsilweys, at rates of psy designed to support 
a ncivilisedn (white) standard of living, was designed rather for the 
unskilled white. Whether of the rural bywoner type or recent arrivals 
in the towns, the poor whites we= mainly Afrikaners, and this aspect 
of Pact policy was presumably pronoted chiefly by the Nationalists. 
It has often been suggwsted that the limited extent to which 
issues of Native Policy served to divide the white parties was partly 
a matter of priorities. If there was over-preoccupation with white- 
white issues, this was because the politicians believed that the 
establishment of a united wbite nation was a prerequisite to a successful 
response to the "Native problem". Smuts, in particular, was inclined 
to utter wings at moments of internecine strife among the whites, 
depicting them as confronted a l m s  by the in%ractable fact of the non- 
white majority. To the  :qationdiats these wexnhga meant little. For 
them Afrikaner uni* was more urgsnt than white unit;y. The party was 
more overtly anti-inperis1.ist than anti-black. Eost of their party 
opponents accepted the same order of priorities. !!%us the former 
Unionist Sir Char1es Crewe argued in l926 on behalf of the S.A.P. that 
the motivation behind Herteog's onslaught on the Cepe African frauchise 
was to weaken the imperial connection. Since disfranchisement would 
mean that "nearly 14,000 Britiah votes would be lostw, it should be 
opposed. It was not the upholding of the liberal tradition that was 
invoked but the need to safegwmd the bperial connection against the 
seceesionist party. In practice, of course, the priorities did not work 
out. The nettle of Native Policy had to be grasped -. But it wss 
the primaor of white-white issues and the failure of any stable solution 
to these to merge that determined the medium in which the fumbling 
ruling responses to black-white problem were made. 
Turning to the relation of political activity on the part of 
non-whites themselves to party politics, we begin with the Cape 
franchise. Before Union, the Cape's African and Coloured voters made 
up some 16% of the total electorate. In four of the constituencies the 
figure was 30%. and-them were someson-white voters in every 
constituency. This meant that once a party system had evolved in the 
Cape, which wan the case by 1898, there were several constituencies in 
which non-white voters held the balance between the two main parties, 
the S.A.P. and the Progressives. In those seats, mainly in the eastern 
Cape, in which the non-white voters were mainly Africans, local leaders 
emerged who in the end decided the question as to which of the two white 
pasties would receive the bulk of the African votes at their disposal. 
The situation in those seats in which the non-white voters were mainly 
Coloureds is less clear. There certainly was competition for their 
votes betwean the white parties, and this served to divide the African 
Political Organisation, the mairr Coloured body. It seems undeniable 
that in the framework of Cape politics the working of the party aystem 
served to safeguard the voting rights of non-whites. The hgnchise 
and Ballot Act of 1892 had been passed with the object of reducing the 
number of tribal Africans likely to qualify as voters, but at that time 
there wan no proper party system in operation. Largely for the reason 
that the number of non-white voters remained more or less constant, no 
later moves were in fact made to raise the qualifications further or to 
tamper in any way with the non-raoial franchise. Such moves would, in 
any case, have been likely to fail because of the need to obtain the 
support of both parties for them. hridently these pasty co~lsiderations, 
rather than a Cape liberal tradition conceived in isolation from them, 
provide the chief explanation for the survival of non-white voting 
ri&ts there. 
Under Union the situation was totally different. The 
proportion of non-white voters to the total Union electorate was less 
than % by 1929 (Coloureds 5.6%, bfricslu, 3.4%). Since Onion 
constituencies were larger than those of the old Cape assembly, the 
number of seats in which non-white votes could be decisive was smaller 
than before, perhaps ten at most, out of a total of 121. Clearly 
Union had meant a drastic dilution of non-white voting power. The 
dilution was made almost cateetrophic by the legislation of 19% and 
1931. First, white women throughout the Union were enfranchised. In 
the Cape they were not required to meet the existing economic and 
literery qualifications. Then, on the logic that the white men of the 
province should not be required to meet these qualifications while 
their womenfolk were examplied from them, the qualifications were 
abolished in respect of W t e  men also. The result was that by 1935 
non-white voters constituted only 3.7% of the total Union electorate 
(Ccloureds 2.696, Africans 1.1%). 
Hertsog*~ developing onslaught on the Cape African hgachise 
has to be viewed in the context of his generally segregationist 
approach to Kative Affairs. He regarded the abolition of that 
fanchise as the key requirement. In view of their numbers, he 
believed that as more of them qualified for the vote the Africans at 
the Cape would, in due course, wswamp91 the white electoxate. Cape 
m b e r s  of parliament would m u a l l y  find themselves compelled to 
suppost what would become universal demands among Union Africans: 
that the Cape fxanchise be extended to the other provinces aud that 
non-whites be given the ri&t to sit in parliament. For Herteog, the 
immediate danger lay in any increase in the dependence of Cape 
members of parliament on African voters. As such an increase took 
place the task of p e m m d b g  a sufficient number of Cape H.P.8 to 
faraish the necessary two-thirds majority for the abolition of the 
franchise would become more difficult. 
In parliament Herteog's systematic and open attscks on the 
Cape fmmzhise for Bfricans began in 1920. He was clearly not driven 
to make them by pressures in his own psrty. Equally, his object was 
not to secure soy petty electoral advantage for it. At the same time, 
in giving the lead he did he was sure of the backing of the whole of 
his own party, including its Cape se-t, and also much support 
outside it. lFrom the ranks of his own psrty the only oriticism of 
his masures in this connection wss directed against the compromises 
he was prepared to make to secure his main objective. 
In the case of the S.A.P. as an opposition, party 
considerations loomed rather larger. Estimates vary, but there were 
probably only four seats in which the abolition of the franchise for 
Africans would have involved the loss of S.A.P.-held seats to the 
Nationalists. Elsewhere in the Cape the S.A.P. would have suffered a 
net loss of perhaps 8,000 voters spread over all the r e n u r u g  . . 
conetituenoies. More  siepificant waa the fact  that the S.A.P. 
divided on the specific issue of the franchise. A d l g r a u p  of 
liberals,  a l l  from the Cape at this time, ware wedded to  it aa a matter 
of principle. The bulk of the p l i a m e n ~  party in the other three 
provinces, PMluding Faglish-speaking menbere from the Tramvaal and 
N a t a l ,  were in fact opposed fo the Cape fnmohicte, et leas t  in its 
application t o  Africans. Ils a whole, the p* was prepared to accept 
Smutsblead. Evenlxdly, a f t e r  h i s  talks with Hertsog 0x1 a possible 
bi-partisan policy M failed, Smut8 called fo r  a ctecond nlBstienal 
Convention" 68 the whole issue cf Native Policy, including the frauohise, 
in ordex to  s e t t l e  the question outside the sphere csf party pol i t ics  
(the familiar illusion) ad t o  secure the greatest possible agreement 
among the ?&tea. Smut8 was also more concerned then Hertaog t o  obtain 
some kind of foraOl dfrican acquiescence in any meamamas -that were 
faken, perhaps with a view t o  meeting tbe criticism that vae certain t o  
come fronn l iberal  sources outside the country. 
In the end, in 1936, w i t h  the erception of a hmidful ~f 
-beray the p a r l i a m m w  S.A.P. did vate fo r  the removal of Cape 
Africaas from the camon roll. This sequel strengthens the case fo r  
re- the S.A.P. opposition t o  Hertzogls policy in the l a t e  
~ t w m t i e s  aa having been deterarLned by party consideratione. On the 
latter occasion, with coalition ad fueioe having suspended conflict 
along nllom&Ln h p -  lines, these considerations were absent. !Phe 
fact  that moh a situation could ar ise  at all  points not merev to the 
inaaewy of the entre?achwmt negatiated in 1908 but also t o  the 
pol i t ica l  weakness of -&m rights that were entrenched. The workings of 
party politics, inol.lldjng the weiglht given t o  what survived of non- 
a t e  voting strength, gave some protection t o  these rights - but only 
fo r  a t ime. Althouefi the matter arses never put t o  the tes t ,  the degree 
of such protection which the riats had enjoyed in Cape Colony i t s e l f ,  
where there W been ao entrmchmmt, waa obviously far greater. 
On the frsnchise as well as on ether queatione thet 
concerned them there were abundant expressions of non-white opinion. 
Articulate BPricslr opinion was v5rtually unauimou~ in supporting the 
retention of the Cape Praachise. This applies also t o  Bfricans outside 
%he Cape wfrc did not want any sepcumte rep~elrentation f o r  themselves 
(which wauld ham, impmved their own position) i f  this meat any 
tamape-=ing w i t h  the Cape -se. As Clrief Kamalo explained t o  the 
Select CQBlittee in 1927, "as loag as the Cape people lime the vote we 
hold that in due a m a  of time we shall also ham the voten. Such 
~iewa,  together with the denmad f o r  tho right of Af r icaa~  t o  sit in 
Pm could be, and -, wed ty the Nationalists t o  give 
slabstance to  thei r  feere abmt the, hitare effects of the Cape franchiseo 
As far os non-white pol i t ica l  aasociatione and pressure grorrps 
are concerned, thei r  roles were n e o e s s d l y  outside the mmm of pas$- 
politics. They ven, also much *eakar strucimms than the part ies and 
far mom divided. They are imporbut lees f o r  any power they could 
exercise than fo r  the opinions and attitudes they expressed. !Chey give 
us Africsn, Indian d Col~llrad nvoicesn rather then pol i t ica l  
a t i v i t y  in prsrsuit of at-ble ends. Of coume, tMe needs 
~ual i f icat ion.  If %S Wat agzw~1pen.t resulted in benefits 
for Indiene, this had something to do with the demonstratione of 1913. 
It also had to do with the imperial side of the lirdian guestion. On 
both counts the ETetionalists objected to the concessions they held 
IBstba and &nuts to have made. Throughout this period the African 
National Congress (originally the South African lPative National 
Congress of 1912) was simply a voice. Whether the voice was 
repzesentative of more than the amall group of mission-educated 
Africans (includiag breditarp chiefs) from which its membership was 
drawn seem dculbtrn. 
- 
m e  case of Clslnents gadsliela Industrial and Cmnercial 
Workers' Union was clearly different. For a time after World War I 
this orgadzation of African workers flourished as something of a mass 
movement, particulsl:ly in the Cape's eastern province, and showed 
itself capable of hapiring strike action. There waa a stage durhg 
which both Smuts & Herteog showed some respect for Kadalie and a 
willhp3ss to accommdate to some of the 1.c.U.'~ deamde. 'Phis was 
cleasly linked to the importance of African votes in the Cape at a 
t h e  of near paritf between the tuo main parties. The indicators are 
that in the general election of 1921 the influence of the I.C.U. waa 
placed at the disposal of Smts and the S.A.P., a pmbability which 
leay explain why the deportation meves sgrrinst Kadalie were a W n e d  
earlier that yee. JCrr the 1924 election the 1.C.U. evidently 
sapported the Pact pasties, particularly the PlstionaLists. Dmbg the 
Pate qtwenties the I.C.U. seem to have declined. Where there were 
no cPoubt other caasea, the Pact's legislatim strikes by 1 
Afkioan trade unions illegal, and ion of the LBative I 
Abinistraa%ion Act of 1927 directe t those alleged to be 
pmmating whostilitg between Natives aad Europeansw, cel?tainly played 
a, p&. 
kch  +hat was new in African political aativity was taking 
place as a response to social and economic change. S m e  of it was 
local and spontaworra, as wae the case with the followers of the 
prophet Enooh, who were shot down at Bdlhoek in 1921, sod w i t h  several 
strikes by differat gmgps of Afxican workers. To the extent that 
new organiza~iona appeexed, Africana were conceivably demonstrating 
more power as we get closex to l9jO than had been possible up to 1910 
(if we diacount the tribal resistanae offered by a section of the 
Zulua in 1906-8). In relative tenas this was entirely d e e d  by the 
growth in the power of the n e w l y  foanet3,whit.e-d %ed state, in 
tern of its laws as well as its eve- and cmrcive agencies. 
Su@h political activity by Africans aa there waa ]nay have been disliked 
by m s t  whites, 'bnat it oould not be regamled aa a serious theat to 
the* position. The impact sf political activity by non-Mtes 
&'anexally m, at the level of party politics, therefore sliat. 
HBlreook cbae~lres -,in the general circll~~efances of the 
South African situation, the r u l  would be unlikely to make 
conceeaiona exoept under I, p. 319). Non-white 
political aetivitg in this period amounted to p r e s m  of a kind. Some 
oapacity for disraptive local action, strikes and poesive disobedience 
mrs shown. Some contribution ~ 8 8 1  made to an emerging pattern of 
rasiatance to "colonialw (or white mhcrity) rule. In the e m t ,  the 
pressure proved not to be of the kind that wam capable of erecting 
concessions. Instead, the 0pposit.e happened and coercive measures on 
the part of the white-domin~ted state not only increased but far 
outstripped the techniques of the non-white organizations. Non-white 
political activity, by amusing white fewxi of the consequences, 
pre-bly also conkributed to a hardening of white attitudes againet 
any non-white political a d m e .  A priori reasoning along these lines 
needs to be backed by evidence. It is also not clear whether the 
increase in coercive meafmms was simply the work of the gave-ent and 
authorities acting on their own Mtiative, or whether t h q  were 
responding to +he presearar of the political parties and white opinislo. 
Haay non-white critics muld take the view that party aad 
other diffecenoes arang the whites hnve been, at best, simply 
irrelevant to the welfare of the non-whites and, at worst, "the 
quarrels of robborn over the spoils". Whatever the party in pewer, the 
policies ef gaveniieent and parliament since Union would be held ta, have 
been in the same essential mould and to have eerrred throu&ut to 
underpin white sup sPd white ecommic advantage. This view 
might enderne the idea that differences in the sphvra of Native Poliey 
were in fact quite small but =re exaggerated by politicians culrieue to 
forge a new weapon in the party struggle. Alternatively, it might hold 
that the biffemnces ware =rely ever what were the best ~lesns to 
a w e  ends that were a attar of agreement among the whites but 
worked unifoxzdy to the disadvautage of the non-whites. 
The detexdnist and question-begging streak in this view is 
present in some other overall approaches to the recent political histery 
of South Africa. It is tempting to regard the triumph of Afrikamr 
nationalism in 1948 se the tenuinal point in a prolonged series of 
mves torerds such a goal. The outcome seem almost logical as the 
Bmction of MiEraner numerical preponderance in the electorate. The 
sigrrposts axe clear: 1912, 1924 and 1933. The heroes change: firat 
Hertsog, then Merlen and Strijdom. Even here the fact of the plarel 
societg asserts itself, but in a subsidia~cg. role. What is involved is 
the apparent tendenay of the m s t  explicitly self-interested and 
discriminstory appeals to the white race to score electoral success. 
Hartsog mrs helpetl. in 1924 and 1929, Edan in 1948. 
In effect, Union had meant the grant of self-deteraination, 
tkimgh the institution of parliamentary deslocxwqy, to the white 
electorate. In the long nm the right of self-dotemination was seised 
and monopolised, within the rules of the constitutional framework, by 
Mrihaer nationalisrts. In &)sense which rme imperfectly reco@.&ed 
at the time, Union also mesat the cession to the white minari* of 
political supremacy over all other groups i n  a plural society. New it 
could be held %hat the institutiians of aelf-gwamment, especially 
w h m  m& the virtual preserve of a minority, would not be workable in 
a lsixsd sociatg (again, in the long run) along lines that would be 
regaded as norneS elsewhere. They would tend to be manipulated by 
the privileged lainority to entrench its position still further and to 
protect special interests within the fold. Sooner or later, in 
mactia, challenges to the political system would come from the mbject 
gseups, at first over particulae questions but ultimately zqpinst the 
very beeis of the ajretem itself. The response of the ruling minority 
would then be to seek to imppress those challenges th-zmgh the power 
of the etate. Logically, the process could end in the destruction of 
even the trappings of the system of parlianentsrg demcrscy on whioh 
that power vaa criglnally based. In applying Acton'e bbctum in this 
wag, we are clearly ebcpthg from party politics to the roots of 
authoritarian rdle h Smath Africa. At the same tire, if there is 
any sense in this qproach, the tendency adduced might well have 
been present fmn the start, and th historim trging to keep p- 
politics in view woald then certainly encounter it. 
The deterrPiaist element in the approaches just discussed 
shoal4 not be accepted rmcritically. Lord Selborne complained that 
"8 parliamnt of white m e a m  was the worst form of govemmmt for an 
African majoritq. On the other hand, it could be shown that over the 
yeam the parliamen* system has not necessarily been ths most 
efficient instrument of eppression and exploitation. dhetice n m t  
slso be done to the fluidity that was so often a feature of the 
political situation. Aa far as party fortunes a m  concelped, there 
have been moments of m a t  uncertainty in Sonth Africa - for 
example, in thie period, at the general elections of 1915, 1920 and 
even 1924. m e  campldties only emerge when the probleans axe 
investigated h detail. To illuminate this r)srk Agew in South 
African histom, the studies in depth still have to be done. 
